Irreversibility of Voluntary Nuclear Disarmament

Abstract

This thesis sets out to answer the overarching question, “How irreversible is the nuclear disarmament of countries that voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons?” with a specific sub-question regarding “How irreversible is Ukraine’s decision of nuclear disarmament in the context of its war with Russia?” Drawing on four cases—South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—path dependency theory was used to illuminate how initial decisions to relinquish nuclear arsenals become “locked in” over time through increasing returns, high switching costs, adaptive expectations, and normative entrenchment. To answer these research questions, a qualitative methodology was employed. First, extensive desk research provided historical and technical context about each country’s original acquisition of nuclear capabilities, subsequent disarmament decisions, and the influence of international frameworks such as the NPT and the Budapest Memorandum. Second, semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials and experts who offered firsthand insights into the domestic, diplomatic, and security considerations shaping each state’s stance. This combination of document analysis and interviews made it possible to compare how specific political transitions, economic interests, public sentiment, and international pressures affected the durability of disarmament choices. This research paper reveals that voluntary nuclear disarmament, though not infallible, can become deeply rooted through path dependency. Under normal circumstances, the convergence of self-reinforcing technical, economic, and normative factors renders a return to nuclear arms prohibitively costly. Even harsh shocks—like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—have not reversed disarmament in practice, though they may inspire new debates and rhetorical regrets. Ultimately, irreversibility emerges not as an absolute, static condition but as a robust, evolving equilibrium. So long as the international community continues to uphold nonproliferation norms, sustain effective institutions, and provide incentives for peaceful nuclear development, the states that once chose to disarm will likely remain on that track—demonstrating that, despite inherent fragility, the post-disarmament status quo can endure even under profound strain.