The Logic of Repression in Kyrgyzstan the Pathes from Demonstrations to Revolutions

Abstract

This paper is focused on Kyrgyzstan’s domestic political conflict events that had an antiregime character with direct political significance and involved political elites as dissidents during two regimes. Namely, it studies November peaceful demonstrations of 2006, violent riots of 2002 Aksy event and revolutionary protest activities of the Tulip Revolution, 2007 April demonstrations and 2010 Second Revolution. Through systematic study of repressive behavior and protest activities in these events, the paper tries to understand the puzzle of why did Kyrgyz regimes use low level of repression? What was the decision-making basis of regimes to apply repression not high enough to eliminate revolutionary threats? Using decision-making theory the research also attempts to prove that there is direct relationship between degree of threat perception and level of repression. When a regime senses a revolutionary threat or highly disruptive protest activity accompanied with violence, it consequently applies medium or high level of repression. These events under study suggest that opposition provokes high repression with its violent and illegal means of protest activities. The second major finding is that any level of state repression increases oppositional protest activities to very violent or revolutionary forms. The results of this investigation also show that any level of repression targeted at opposition is costly for the government. It costs them loosing legitimacy or removal from power. The analysis of five events using decision-making theory extends our knowledge of repressive behavior of regimes and how internal decision-making calculations serve as a base for employment of repression.