The Dynamics of Elite Bargaining in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Abstract

Is the Afghanistan National Unity Government (NUG) inclusive? On what basis, the ruling elites have chosen the cabinet members? Is the power shared equitably between political networks representing different ethnic groups? This paper studies the dynamics of elite bargaining following the ‘elite settlement’ in Bonn process with focus on NUG. The political leaders matter. Their political activities, their interactions and the discourses they produce and positions they take largely affect the political development. Viewing politics as struggle for power between competing power brokers (elites), the study of elite bargaining is vital for better understanding of the political dynamics. This thesis, therefore, explores the dynamics of elite bargain and limitations associated with it in contemporary Afghanistan. This thesis is based on case study of National Unity Government, formed ad hoc in 2014 as a solution to electoral crisis, supplemented by interview with Afghan informants who have been involved in politics, working within the government, teaching and writing about politics. Based on findings, this paper concludes that the two teams leading the NUG have been interlocked in constant struggle for control of strategic positions within the government, resulted in marginalization of major non-Pashtun elites and monopoly of power by one group. This paper argues that the façade of power sharing arrangement is inclusive, whereas the de facto power is concentrated in the hand of ‘inner circle’ of power close to the ruling elite, which generated discontent among the constituencies of marginalized ethno-regional power brokers.