Securitization of Cyberspace of Kazakhstan

Abstract

This thesis yields evidences of how the state discursively designed the issue of cybersecurity in Kazakhstan, and, on the basis of such evidences, applies Kazakhstani context in relation to cyber securitization theory developed by Hansen and Nissenbaum with the aim of uncovering the extent to which it pertains to it. Cyber securitization framework having originated from the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, has been employed in relation to cybersecurity as a separate sector. This framework differentiates from the ‘normal’ securitization theory by its three security modalities: hypersecuritization, everyday security practices, technification. Thus this thesis aims at testing the applicability of Kazakhstani context in relation to the three cyber securitization modalities. In so doing, it employs method of discourse analysis, and examines speech acts of politicians and experts as well as the interconnected body of texts (legal acts, strategies, action plans) that through dissemination and consumption engender an object being framed as an existential threat. Given that cyber securitization framework lacks empirical evidence to prove its validity and robustness, this thesis contributes to the theoretical framework developed by Hansen and Nissenbaum by proposing supplementary empirical evidences. In the course of this study, it is demonstrated that the Kazakhstani scenario of securitization of cyberspace to the full extent pertain to the three cybersecurity modalities.