Peace and Power-Sharing Accords on Afghanistan: An Analysis and Implications for Ongoing Peace Efforts

Abstract

This thesis conducts an analysis of four peace and power-sharing accords on Afghanistan: the Geneva Accords of 1988, the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords of 1992 and 1993 respectively, and the Bonn Agreement of 2001. In so doing, it draws on the theory of path dependence, which argues that what happened in the past will have an effect on the future, and the research methods of desk study, internship, and qualitative interviews with key informants. The thesis identifies five factors that explain the significant or partial failure of these accords: (1) foreign manipulation, (2) politics of exclusion, (3) avoidance to address important political problems, (4) lack of popular participation and support, and (5) circumstantial obstacles (e.g. hurriedly arranged talks and the overtaking of political processes by rapidly changing military conditions). Accordingly, in order to break the vicious cycle, it identifies five implications for a probable future Afghan political settlement: such a settlement should (1) be genuinely Afghan-owned and Afghan-led, (2) be inclusive, (3) be comprehensive, (4) have Afghan people’s participation and support, and (5) not be hurriedly organized and overshadowed by changing military circumstances.